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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Aurelius Capital Management, L.P. (“Aurelius”), 
along with the Law Debenture Trust Company of New York 
and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (the 
“Trustees”), appeal the District Court’s dismissal as equitably 
moot of their appeals from the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
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confirming Tribune’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.  We 
agree with the District Court that Aurelius’s appeal, which 
seeks to undo the crucial component of the now consummated 
plan, should be deemed moot.  However, we reverse and 
remand with respect to the Trustees.  They seek disgorgement 
from other creditors of $30 million that the Trustees believe 
they are contractually entitled to receive.  As the relief the 
Trustees request would neither jeopardize the $7.5 billion 
plan of reorganization nor harm third parties who have 
justifiably relied on plan confirmation, their appeal is not 
equitably moot.   
I. Facts and Procedural History 
In December 2007, the Tribune Company (which 
published the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times 
and held many other properties) was facing a challenging 
business climate.  Sensing an opportunity, Sam Zell, a 
wealthy real estate investor, orchestrated a leveraged buy-out 
(“LBO”), a transaction by which a purchaser (in this case, an 
entity controlled by Zell and, for convenience, referred to by 
that name in this opinion) acquires an entity using debt 
secured by assets of the acquired entity.  Before the LBO, 
Tribune had a market capitalization of approximately $8 
billion and about $5 billion in debt.   
The LBO was taken in two steps: Zell made a tender 
offer to obtain more than half of Tribune’s shares at Step 
One, followed by a purchase of all remaining shares at Step 
Two.  In this LBO, as is typical, Zell obtained financing 
(called here the “LBO debt”) to purchase Tribune secured by 
Tribune’s assets, meaning that Zell had nothing at risk.  The 
transaction took Tribune private and saddled the company 
with an additional $8 billion of debt.  Moreover, as a part of 
the sale, Tribune’s subsidiaries guaranteed the LBO debt.  
The holders of the debt that Tribune carried before Zell took 
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it over (the “pre-LBO debt”) had recourse only against 
Tribune, not against the subsidiaries.  Thus the LBO debt, 
guaranteed by solvent subsidiaries, had “structural seniority” 
over the pre-LBO debt. 
Unsurprisingly, Tribune, in a declining industry with a 
precarious balance sheet, eventually sought bankruptcy 
protection.  It filed under Chapter 11 in December 2008, and 
at some later point Aurelius, a hedge fund specializing in 
distressed debt, bought $2 billion of the pre-LBO debt and 
became an active participant in the bankruptcy process.  (We 
do not know how much Aurelius paid for this debt.) 
Ten days after the filing, the U.S. Trustee appointed 
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the 
“Committee”), which obtained permission to pursue various 
causes of action (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent 
conveyance) on behalf of the estate against the LBO lenders, 
directors and officers of old Tribune, Zell, and others 
(collectively called the “LBO-Related Causes of Action,” see 
In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 136 n.7 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011)1).  As the Bankruptcy Court put it, “[f]rom the outset 
. . . the major constituents understood that the investigation 
and resolution of the LBO-Related Causes of Action would 
                                              
1 This is the most relevant Bankruptcy Court opinion we 
review, though it ultimately denied confirmation of both of 
the competing plans referred to below—the Noteholder Plan 
and the DCL Plan.  The latter denial was on narrow curable 
grounds that the DCL Plan proponents quickly addressed, and 
thus much of the reasoning supporting Judge Carey’s decision 
to confirm the plan he did is included in the opinion initially 
denying confirmation. 
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be a central issue in the formulation of a plan of 
reorganization.”  Id. at 142. 
Various groups of stakeholders proposed plans of 
reorganization; the important ones for the purposes of this 
appeal are Aurelius’s (the “Noteholder Plan”) and one 
sponsored by the Debtor, the Committee, and certain senior 
lenders, called the “DCL Plan” (for 
Debtor/Committee/Lender) or simply the “Plan.”  The 
primary difference between the Noteholder and the DCL 
Plans was that the proponents of the former (the 
“Noteholders”) wanted to litigate the LBO-Related Causes of 
Action while the DCL Plan proposed to settle them.  
Kenneth Klee, one of the principal drafters of the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, was appointed the examiner in this 
case, and he valued the various causes of action to help the 
parties settle them.  Professor Klee concluded that whether 
Step One left Tribune insolvent (and was thus constructively 
fraudulent) was a “very close call” if Step Two debt was 
included for the purposes of this calculation.  Id. at 159.  He 
further concluded that a court was “somewhat likely” to find 
intentional fraud and “highly likely” to find constructive 
fraud at Step Two.  Id.  He also valued the recoveries to 
Aurelius’s and the Trustees’ classes of debt under the various 
litigation scenarios and concluded that the DCL Plan 
settlement offered more money ($432 million) than all six 
possible litigation outcomes except full avoidance of the LBO 
transactions, which would have afforded the pre-LBO lenders 
$1.3 billion.  Id. at 161.  Given these findings for both steps 
of the LBO, full recovery was a possibility. 
The DCL Plan restructured Tribune’s debt, settled 
many of the LBO-Related Causes of Action for $369 million, 
and assigned other claims to a litigation trust that would 
continue to pursue them and pay out any proceeds according 
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to a waterfall structure whereby the pre-LBO lenders stand to 
receive the first $90 million and 65% of the Trust’s recoveries 
over $110 million (this aspect of the Plan we refer to as the 
“Settlement”).  Aurelius objected because it believes the 
LBO-Related Causes of Action are worth far more than the 
examiner or Bankruptcy Court thought and that it can get a 
great deal more money in litigation than it got under the 
Settlement.  The Bankruptcy Court’s opinion on 
confirmation, thoroughly done by Judge Kevin Carey, 
discussed the parties’ disagreement at length and ultimately 
concluded that it was “uncertain” that litigation would result 
in full avoidance of the LBO.  Id. at 174.  And full avoidance 
was the only result the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion suggests 
could plausibly result in greater recovery than the Settlement.  
See id. at 161 (citing examiner’s opinion that only full 
avoidance could exceed settlement value); 174 (rejecting 
contrary expert opinions).  Thus the Court held that the 
Settlement was reasonable, and, on July 23, 2012, the DCL 
Plan was confirmed over Aurelius’s objection. 
Aurelius promptly moved for a stay pending appeal 
under Bankruptcy Rule 8007.  The Bankruptcy Court held a 
hearing on the motion at which it considered whether to issue 
a stay and, if so, whether to condition it on a bond.  Aurelius 
opposed posting a bond in any amount.  The Court stayed its 
confirmation order, but it also considered how much an 
unsuccessful appeal by Aurelius would cost Tribune.  As a 
result of this valuation, the Court conditioned its stay on 
Aurelius’s posting a $1.5 billion bond to indemnify Tribune 
against the estimated costs associated with staying the order 
for the likely time to appeal.  In re Tribune Co., 477 B.R. 465, 
482 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
With the threat of equitable mootness looming, 
Aurelius and the Trustees filed emergency motions to vacate 
the bond requirement and to expedite their appeals.  The 
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District Court, however, denied the motions and ordered that 
the briefing schedule for these appeals would be the same as 
for other appealing parties (who are not before us).  Aurelius 
appealed the denial of the motions related to the bond 
requirement, but we dismissed the appeal for want of 
appellate jurisdiction (the denials were not final orders).   
Aurelius objected that the amount of the bond was 
prohibitively high, but it has never argued to any court that a 
lower amount would be reasonable; rather, it has consistently 
tried to eliminate the bond requirement altogether. 
The appeals were fully briefed in the District Court on 
October 11, 2012, when Aurelius and the Trustees again 
moved to have their appeals heard separately from the other 
pending appeals; the District Court did not rule on this motion 
(which Tribune opposed).  On December 5, 2012, Aurelius 
again moved for expedition (the Court again denied the 
motion), and the Plan was consummated on December 31.  
On January 18, 2013, Tribune moved to dismiss the appeals 
as equitably moot.  About 18 months later, the District Court 
granted that motion. 
As all agreed, the plan was substantially consummated, 
and Tribune persuaded the District Court that it could not 
effectively afford relief without causing undue harm either to 
reorganized Tribune or to its investors.  Aurelius appeals, 
arguing that the case is not equitably moot and that the 
Settlement was unreasonably low.  The fund seeks 
modification of the confirmation order to reinstate the LBO-
Related Causes of Action that the Settlement resolved so that 
the claims can be fully litigated or re-settled.   
The Trustees also appeal.  They represent certain pre-
LBO debt treated as “Class 1E creditors” in the Plan.  They 
argue that they had subordination agreements with the holders 
of two series of pre-LBO notes Tribune issued, called the 
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PHONES Notes and the EGI Notes, worth a total of about 
$30 million.  According to the subordination agreements, if 
Tribune went bankrupt, any recovery by the PHONES and 
EGI Notes would be payable to the Class 1E holders.  
However, the Plan provides that any recovery from those 
Notes will be distributed pro rata between Class 1E and Class 
1F .  The latter has about 700 creditors in it, the majority of 
whom “are individuals and small-business trade creditors.”  
In re Tribune Co., Nos. 12-cv-1072 et al., 2014 WL 2797042, 
at *6 (D. Del. June 18, 2014).  Further complicating the 
intercreditor dispute is that under the Plan Class 1F members 
were allowed to choose one of two payment options: either 
they could receive a lump sum at the time of their election or 
they could participate in the Plan’s litigation trust (the latter 
holding out a potentially greater, but more uncertain, 
recovery).  The Trustees contend that the Plan gives Class 1F 
$30 million dollars that should go to Class 1E, and they 
propose several ways in which Class 1E could recover that 
money without fatally unravelling the Plan.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 
1291. We review the Court’s equitable mootness 
determination for abuse of discretion.2 
                                              
2 A panel of our Court was “inclined to agree with” then-
Judge Alito’s criticism, see In re Continental Airlines, 91 
F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., 
dissenting), that “‘this standard of review [] contradict[s] our 
precedent that[,] where the district court sits as an appellate 
court, we exercise plenary review.’”  In re SemCrude, L.P., 
728 F.3d 314, 320 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 167–68 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2012)).  However, as was true in SemCrude, the abuse-of-
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II. Discussion 
 A. The Doctrine of Equitable Mootness 
“Equitable mootness” is a narrow doctrine by which an 
appellate court deems it prudent for practical reasons to 
forbear deciding an appeal when to grant the relief requested 
will undermine the finality and reliability of consummated 
plans of reorganization.3  The party seeking to invoke the 
doctrine bears the burden of overcoming the strong 
presumption that appeals from confirmation orders of 
reorganization plans—even those not only approved by 
confirmation but implemented thereafter (called “substantial 
consummation” or simply “consummation”)—need to be 
decided.  In re SemCrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Unless we can readily resolve the merits of an appeal 
against the appealing party, our starting point is the relief an 
appellant specifically asks for.  And even “when a court 
applies the doctrine of equitable mootness, it does so with a 
scalpel rather than an axe.  To that end, a court may fashion 
                                                                                                     
discretion standard of review remains the law of our Circuit.  
Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 560. 
3 “Equitably moot” bankruptcy appeals are not necessarily 
“moot” in the constitutional sense: they may persist in very 
live dispute between adverse parties.  Thus, in the Seventh 
Circuit, Judge Easterbrook “banish[ed] ‘equitable mootness’ 
from the (local) lexicon.” In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 
769 (7th Cir. 1994).  In SemCrude, 728 F.3d at 317 n.2, we 
noted that the term “prudential forbearance” more accurately 
reflects the decision to decline hearing the merits of an appeal 
because of its feared consequences should a bankruptcy 
court’s decision approving plan confirmation be reversed. 
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whatever relief is practicable instead of declining review 
simply because full relief is not available.”  In re Blast 
Energy Servs., Inc., 593 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
We first recognized the doctrine of equitable mootness 
in In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc).  The case closely divided our Court, with seven judges 
voting to recognize the doctrine over the dissent of six.  We 
explicitly held that it was the law of our Circuit but did not 
lay down any particularly clear guidance on how to decide 
whether an appeal was moot.  Instead, the majority opinion 
noted certain factors theretofore considered in making a 
mootness call: 
Factors that have been considered by courts in 
determining whether it would be equitable or 
prudential to reach the merits of a bankruptcy 
appeal include (1) whether the reorganization 
plan has been substantially consummated, (2) 
whether a stay has been obtained, (3) whether 
the relief requested would affect the rights of 
parties not before the court, (4) whether the 
relief requested would affect the success of the 
plan, and (5) the public policy of affording 
finality to bankruptcy judgments.   
Id. at 560 (citation omitted).  This statement reveals that the 
doctrine was then, as far as our Court was concerned, in its 
infancy.  Note, for example, that we listed “[f]actors that have 
been considered by courts” without specifying whether those 
factors are entitled to equal weight or whether any is 
necessary or sufficient.  Id.  Over the years, our precedential 
opinions have refined the doctrine to its current, more 
determinate state.  As we recently put it, 
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equitable mootness . . . proceed[s] in two 
analytical steps: (1) whether a confirmed plan 
has been substantially consummated; and (2) if 
so, whether granting the relief requested in the 
appeal will (a) fatally scramble the plan and/or 
(b) significantly harm third parties who have 
justifiably relied on plan confirmation. 
SemCrude, 728 F.3d at 321.   
 This two-step inquiry reduces uncertainty from the 
factors of Continental, and this appeal reflects the importance 
of SemCrude’s step (2): in cases where relief would neither 
fatally scramble the plan nor significantly harm the interests 
of third parties who have justifiably relied on plan 
confirmation, there is no reason to dismiss as equitably moot 
an appeal of a confirmation order for a plan now substantially 
consummated.  For example, reliance on consummation of a 
plan would not be justified if a third party obtained a benefit 
that was inconsistent with a contract, statute, or judgment, as 
any benefit from such an error would result in “ill-gotten 
gains.”  See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 484 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“[I]t would not be inequitable to require the 
parties to [an illegal] agreement to disgorge their ill-gotten 
gains, participation in the appeal or not.”).   
 While courts and counsel readily understand when 
granting relief on appeal would unravel a plan both confirmed 
and consummated, who are the “third parties” that equitable 
mootness is meant to protect?  Continental singled out 
investors as the “particular” beneficiaries of equitable 
mootness, 91 F.3d at 562, while SemCrude discussed the 
interests of lenders, customers, and suppliers.  728 F.3d at 
325.  Likewise, Philadelphia Newspapers considered the 
interests of “other creditors” who were not equity investors.  
690 F.3d 161, 171 (3d Cir. 2012).  These cases teach that, 
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although parties other than equity investors may rely on plan 
consummation and thus claim protection in the form of 
equitable mootness, they may not “merit the same ‘outside 
investor’ status as” those who make equity investments in a 
reorganized entity.  In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 250 B.R. 207, 
217 (D. Del. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Nordhoff Investments, Inc. 
v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001).   
One reason some third parties have reliance interests 
more worthy of protection than others is that we want to 
encourage behavior (like investment in a reorganized entity) 
that contributes to a successful reorganization.  See 
Continental, 91 F.3d at 564 (“[T]here was an integral nexus 
between the investment [by the parties urging mootness] and 
the success of the Plan.”); see also id. at 563 (“[T]he Eastern 
claims were crucial to the willingness of the Investors to 
consummate the Financing Transaction.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
Also, in appropriate circumstances we further the free 
flow of commerce—a chief concern of commercial 
bankruptcy—when we decline to disturb “complex 
transactions undertaken after the Plan was consummated” that 
would be most difficult to unravel.  Charter, 691 F.3d at 485 
(“The Allen Settlement was the product of an intense multi-
party negotiation, and removing a critical piece of the Allen 
Settlement—such as Allen’s compensation and the third-party 
releases—would impact other terms of the agreement and 
throw into doubt the viability of the entire Plan.”); see also id. 
at 486 (“[T]he third-party releases were critical to the bargain 
that allowed Charter to successfully restructure[,] and . . . 
undoing them, as the plaintiffs urge, would cut the heart out 
of the reorganization.”). 
At the same time, if funds can be recovered from third 
parties without a plan coming apart, it weighs heavily against 
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barring an appeal as equitably moot, both in our Court and 
other circuits.  See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 
236–37 (3d Cir. 2000) (appeal not moot where appellant 
“seeks to invalidate releases that affect the rights and 
liabilities of third parties [and t]he plan has been substantially 
consummated, but . . . the plan could go forward even if the 
releases were struck”); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1342 
(10th Cir. 2009) (“The substantial consummation of a 
bankruptcy plan may make providing relief difficult, and may 
raise concerns about fairness to third parties, but ‘[c]ourts can 
and do order divestiture or damages in’ situations where 
business deals or bankruptcy plans have been wrongly 
consummated.” (quoting In re Res. Tech. Corp., 430 F.3d 
884, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2005) (alteration in Paige))).  We agree 
with the Second Circuit that the disgorgement of “ill-gotten 
gains” is proper assuming that the disgorgement otherwise 
leaves a plan of reorganization not in tatters.  Charter, 691 
F.3d at 484. 
In addition to the third parties (particularly investors) 
identified in our cases, equitable mootness properly applied 
benefits the estate, In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d 338, 
346 (3d Cir. 2003), and the reorganized entity, id. at 344.  All 
these players have a common interest in the finality of a plan: 
the estate because it can wind up; the reorganized entity 
because it can begin to do business without court supervision 
and can seek funding in the capital markets without the cloud 
of bankruptcy; investors because a reorganized entity will 
command a higher and more stable market value outside of 
bankruptcy; lenders because they can collect interest and 
principal; customers in certain industries who need parts or 
services; and other constituents for different context-specific 
reasons that may boil down to it is easier to do business with 
an entity outside of bankruptcy.  Equitable mootness assures 
these stakeholders that a plan confirmation order is reliable 
and that they may make financial decisions based on a 
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reorganized entity’s exit from Chapter 11 without fear that an 
appellate court will wipe out or interfere with their deal.   
The theme is that the third parties with interests 
protected by equitable mootness generally rely on the 
emergence of a reorganized entity from court supervision.  
When a successful appeal would not fatally scramble a 
confirmed and consummated plan, this specific reliance 
interest most often is not implicated, as the plan stays in place 
(with manageable modifications possible) and the reorganized 
entity remains a going concern.  For example, the remedy of 
taking from one class of stakeholders the amount given to 
them in excess of what the law allows is not apt to be 
inequitable, as there is little likelihood it will have damaging 
ripple effects beyond the classes that the redistribution 
immediately affects.  Consistent with our conclusion in PWS, 
228 F.3d at 236–37, and as the Second Circuit reasoned in 
Charter, 691 F.3d at 484, when taking a payment to which 
one class is not contractually entitled, and giving it to the 
party contractually entitled to those funds, would not 
undermine the basis for other parties’ reliance on the finality 
of confirmation, it makes little sense to deem an appeal 
equitably moot. 
 B. Aurelius’s Appeal is Equitably Moot. 
Aurelius concedes that the DCL Plan is substantially 
consummated, Aurelius Br. at 24 & 26, but it argues that the 
relief it seeks would neither scramble that Plan nor harm third 
parties who have relied on consummation.  Aurelius asks us 
to have the confirmation order modified to reinstate the 
settled LBO-Related Causes of Action.  Id. at 58.  It argues 
that it should be allowed to pursue these claims or settle them 
on more favorable terms and that it can obtain relief from 
reorganized Tribune, from the LBO lenders themselves, or by 
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redistributing the LBO lenders’ future recovery from the 
litigation trust.  Id. at 27–38. 
Aurelius’s argument that the relief it ultimately 
seeks—further recovery on the LBO-Related Causes of 
Action—can be afforded (at least in part) misses the point of 
the equitable mootness inquiry.  We must also ask whether 
the immediate relief Aurelius seeks, revocation of the 
Settlement in the DCL Plan, would “fatally scramble the plan 
and/or . . . significantly harm third parties who have 
justifiably relied on plan confirmation.”  SemCrude, 728 F.3d 
at 321.  We believe it would do both.   
To the first concern (fatal scrambling), the Bankruptcy 
Court noted the obvious: the Settlement was “a central issue 
in the formulation of a plan of reorganization.”  Tribune, 464 
B.R. at 142.  Though it is within the power of an appellate 
court to order the Settlement severed from the Plan and keep 
the rest of the Plan in place—thereby not attempting to 
“unscramble the eggs,” Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 566, 
or turning a court into a “Humpty Dumpty repairman,” In re 
Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 963 F.2d 469, 475 (1st Cir. 
1992), or any other ovoid metaphor—allowing the relief the 
appeal seeks would effectively undermine the Settlement 
(along with the transactions entered in reliance on it) and, as a 
result, recall the entire Plan for a redo.   
Third-party reliance is related here to the problem of 
scrambling the Plan, as returning to the drawing board would 
at a minimum drastically diminish the value of new equity’s 
investment.  That investment no doubt was in reliance on the 
Settlement, as indeed was the reliance of those who voted for 
the Plan.  Aurelius proposed a Noteholder Plan that didn’t 
include a settlement of the LBO-Related Causes of Action, 
and it was overwhelmingly rejected by all but 3 of the 243 
creditor classes (the remaining classes were Aurelius’, the 
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PHONES Notes’, and a third “class in which a single creditor 
holding a claim of $47 voted in favor of both the DCL Plan 
and the Noteholder Plan,” id. at 207).  Revoking the 
Settlement would circumvent the bankruptcy process and give 
Aurelius by judicial fiat what it could not achieve by 
consensus within Chapter 11 proceedings or, we can’t help 
but add, if it had put up a bond. 
On appeal, Aurelius proposes no relief that would not 
involve reopening the LBO-Related Causes of Action.  
Allowing those suits would “‘knock the props out from under 
the authorization for every transaction that has taken place,’” 
thus scrambling this substantially consummated plan and 
upsetting third parties’ reliance on it.  In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Roberts 
Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981)).  In this 
context, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Aurelius’s appeal is equitably moot. 
When determining whether the case is equitably moot, 
we of course must assume Aurelius will prevail on the merits 
because the idea of equitable mootness is that even if Aurelius 
is correct, it would not be fair to award the relief it seeks.  
One might argue that holding the appeal moot is therefore by 
definition inequitable: if Aurelius prevails, that means the 
Bankruptcy Court committed legal error, and it could not be 
inequitable to correct the Court’s mistakes.  The reasons to 
reject this hypothesis are twofold.   
First, bankruptcy is concerned primarily with 
achieving a workable outcome for a diverse array of 
stakeholders, and the reliable finality of a confirmed and 
consummated plan allows all interested parties to organize 
their lives around that fact.  See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and 
Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 529 (1983) (identifying speed as one of 
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“three principal characteristics desirable for a reorganization 
mechanism”).   
Second, and relatedly, an important reason we should 
forbear from hearing a challenge to the order before us is 
because of Aurelius’s failure to post a bond to obtain a stay 
pending appeal.  Courts may condition stays of plan 
confirmation orders pending appeal on the posting of a 
supersedeas bond.  The purpose of requiring such a “bond in 
a bankruptcy court is to indemnify the party prevailing in the 
original action against loss caused by an unsuccessful attempt 
to reverse the holding of the bankruptcy court.”  In re Theatre 
Holding Corp., 22 B.R. 884, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) (made applicable to 
bankruptcy cases by Bankruptcy Rule 7062) provides for 
stays pending appeal as of right when a bond is posted in 
damages actions “or where the judgment is sufficiently 
comparable to a money judgment so that payment on a 
supersedeas bond would provide a satisfactory alternative to 
the appellee.”  10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7062.06 (16th ed. 
2015). 
In this case, the Bankruptcy Court carefully calculated 
the likely damage to the estate of a stay pending an appeal 
from its confirmation order.  In particular, it analyzed the 
following costs to Tribune and its creditors that a stay would 
cause: additional professional fees, opportunity costs to 
creditors who would receive delayed distributions from the 
DCL Plan or delayed interest and principal payments from 
reorganized Tribune, and a loss in market value to equity 
investors caused by the delayed emergence.  Tribune, 477 
B.R. at 480–83.  We need not go through the opinion in 
detail, as Aurelius does not squarely argue that the bond 
requirement was an abuse of discretion, but we note that the 
valuation was well-considered and as convincing as the 
alchemy of valuation in bankruptcy can be. 
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As a result of its calculations, the Court determined 
that Aurelius should post a $1.5 billion bond to guarantee that 
the estate could be indemnified in the case of an unsuccessful 
appeal.  Id. at 483.  We repeat that Aurelius never challenged 
the bond amount, instead attempting unsuccessfully to modify 
the order to remove the bond in its entirety.  But given the 
Bankruptcy Court’s findings on the likely substantial loss to 
Tribune due to an appeal, a supersedeas bond in some amount 
was appropriate.  Aurelius’s failure to attempt to reduce the 
bond to a more manageable figure (assuming its 
representations are correct that it would be unable to finance 
such a large bond on short notice) leads us to conclude that it 
effectively chose to risk a finding of equitable mootness and 
implicitly decided that an appeal with a stay conditioned on 
any reasonable bond amount was not worth it.  This risk-
adjusted choice by such a rational actor makes a finding of 
mootness not unfair, as it appears from the record before us 
that Aurelius had the opportunity to obtain a stay that would 
have foreclosed the possibility of a mootness finding.4 
                                              
4 To the extent it could be argued that our approach endangers 
any low-value appeal in a large case (because the cost of a 
stay would overwhelm any potential recovery), we note that 
the lower a potential recovery is, the less likely an appeal is to 
be equitably moot because courts will be more willing to 
make minor changes to a plan of reorganization than big ones.  
See Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 170 (claim worth 1.7% of 
the price of debtor’s assets not equitably moot); Chateaugay, 
10 F.3d at 953 (claim worth up to 10% of a reorganized 
debtor’s working capital was not equitably moot). 
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 C. The Trustees’ Appeal is Not Equitably  
   Moot. 
To reiterate, the Trustees contend that they are 
beneficiaries of a subordination agreement that guarantees 
that they will receive any recovery that goes to the holders of 
the PHONES and EGI Notes ahead of a class of trade and 
other creditors (Class 1F).  This $30 million intercreditor 
dispute is not equitably moot.  Indeed, there is no prudent 
reason to forbear from deciding the merits of the Trustees’ 
appeal. 
Again, it is conceded that the Plan has been 
substantially consummated.  Thus we turn to SemCrude’s 
second question: “whether granting the relief requested in the 
appeal will (a) fatally scramble the plan and/or (b) 
significantly harm third parties who have justifiably relied on 
plan confirmation.”  728 F.3d at 321.  The answer is no. 
The merits question presented by the Trustees’ appeal 
is straightforward: does the Plan unfairly allocate Class 1E’s 
recovery to 1F?  If the answer is yes, disgorgement could be 
ordered against those Class 1F holders who have received 
more than their fair share, and the Litigation Trust’s waterfall 
can be restructured to make sure that 1E gets its recovery to 
the exclusion of 1F.  There’s no chance that this modification 
would unravel the Plan: the dispute is about whether one of 
two classes of creditors is entitled to $30 million in the 
context of a $7.5 billion reorganization.   
Nor, if the Trustees rightly read the subordination 
agreement, has anyone “justifiably relied,” id., on the finality 
of the confirmation order with respect to the $30 million.  It is 
true that some of the money has been paid out, but it has gone 
to a readily identifiable set of creditors against whom 
disgorgement can be ordered, and, assuming the Trustees 
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prevail on the merits, Class 1F members by definition cannot 
justifiably have relied on the payments.  The Class 1F payouts 
are not “ill-gotten,” Charter, 691 F.3d at 484, in the sense that 
the members of that class received them as a result of 
malfeasance, but the Trustees’ argument is that the payments 
were not valid.  Although the trade creditors and retirees who 
make up Class 1F are likely not sophisticated players and 
may have understandably relied on any payouts they received, 
any reliance they have placed on the Plan confirmation and 
implementation—again, assuming the Trustees’ argument on 
the merits is correct—is still not legally justifiable because 
Class 1F’s claim of entitlement to the money is unlawful 
under the Trustees’ interpretation of the relevant contract. 
Moreover, disgorgement from Class 1F is not the only 
possible remedy here (though conceptually it is the most 
straightforward).  On remand, if the Trustees prevail on the 
merits, the District Court could enjoin future revenue streams 
of the litigation trust from going to Class 1F until Class 1E is 
paid in full.  To the extent this would result in disparate initial 
distributions to the members of Class 1F who participated in 
the litigation trust and those who elected all cash 
distributions, the Court could allow payment of this 
difference to the Class 1F creditors who elected to participate 
in the trust first before diverting recoveries to Class 1E, thus 
effectively revoking the option to choose between an initial 
all-cash distribution and partial cash distribution plus 
participation in the litigation trust, as the Trustees suggest.  
Trustees Br. at 19.  Tribune’s only response to this proposal 
by the Trustees is the unsupported statement that it “would be 
a logistical nightmare and would result in chaos.” Tribune 
Response at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We fail to 
see the chaos and thus view this as a possible remedial option 
within the District Court’s discretion. 
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The District Court held in a conclusory fashion that 
“[h]undreds of individuals and small-business trade creditors 
. . . were entitled to rely upon the finality of the Confirmation 
Order,” 2014 WL 2797042 at *6, but that misses the point of 
equitable mootness and elevates finality over all other 
interests.  The Plan has arguably deprived one prepetition 
lender class of $30 million.  Requiring Class 1F to pay $30 
million to Class 1E if the latter prevails on appeal would not 
affect Tribune’s value and thus not any of its investors (nor 
would it harm the estate or new Tribune).  It would be 
unfortunate from the perspective of the members of Class 1F 
to require disgorgement, but, if they were never entitled to 
that money in the first place, it is not unfair, and mootness 
must be fair (equitable in legalese) to be invoked. 
Equitable mootness gives limited protection to those 
who have justifiably relied on the finality of a consummated 
plan, particularly new equity.  No one is arguing that, if the 
Class 1F creditors lose, the consequences would be any worse 
than requiring them to forgo a windfall they never should 
have gotten in the first place.  Because we disagree that this 
class of creditors was entitled to rely on the DCL Plan’s 
finality (once again assuming that the Trustees should prevail 
on appeal), we hold that the District Court made an error of 
law and therefore abused its discretion in holding as it did. 
 D. Delays Below 
Both appellants write with strong language about the 
District Court’s delays in hearing their appeals, and they 
characterize Tribune as having “dragg[ed its] heels” 
throughout the proceeding.  Aurelius Br. at 20; see also 
Trustees Br. at 10 (incorporating by reference Aurelius’s 
argument that Tribune caused delays in hearing any appeal).  
Tribune responds that the District Court did nothing more 
than refuse to give appellants special treatment and that 
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Tribune repeatedly indicated that it would comply with the 
briefing schedule the District Court imposed.  Notably, the 
appellants do not squarely make an argument that the District 
Court abused its discretion in setting a briefing schedule; it 
seems they complain of the timeline to add to the atmosphere 
of unfairness they are trying to conjure.   
In any event, it does not seem that Tribune is to blame 
for the delay.  True, it opposed expedition of the appeal, but 
there is no suggestion that it missed deadlines or filed abusive 
motions for extensions of time.  And the appellants do not 
complain of the delay between consummation (December 31, 
2012) and decision (June 2014); rather, they complain that the 
District Court should have decided the case sometime 
between plan confirmation (July 23, 2012) and consummation 
(again, December 31, 2012).  One hundred sixty-one days is 
not short, but it’s also not unusual for large cases to take that 
long to decide.  Most importantly, Aurelius and the Trustees 
do not actually seek relief for the delay; they just complain 
about it.  For all these reasons, the delays below, though 
arguably unfortunate, do not affect the analysis here. 
IV. Conclusion 
Aurelius’s appeal is equitably moot: the DCL Plan is 
consummated; Aurelius spurned the offer of a stay 
accompanied by a bond; and it would be unfair to Tribune’s 
investors, among others, to allow Aurelius to undo the most 
important aspect of the overwhelmingly approved Plan.  By 
contrast, the Trustees’ appeal is not equitably moot: assuming 
the Trustees prevail on the merits, Class 1F holders must 
forgo gains to which they were never entitled.  Other third 
parties will not be harmed, nor is the Plan even remotely 
called into question.  We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judge, joins, concurring.  
Counsel for Aurelius and the Trustees asserted at oral 
argument that our en banc case In re Continental Airlines, 91 
F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996), wrongly recognized the doctrine of 
equitable mootness.  At least one esteemed colleague of our 
Court agrees and has called for its reconsideration.  See In re: 
One2One Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13-3410, 2015 WL 4430302, 
at *7 (3d Cir. July 21, 2015) (Krause, J., concurring).  The 
One2One concurrence makes three principal challenges to the 
doctrine: constitutional (Article III of the Constitution 
requires supervision of decisions by Article I bankruptcy 
judges); statutory (the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize 
equitable mootness); and prudential (it is unfair to appellants 
to deny them relief when a bankruptcy or district court has 
made an error of law).  While we do not need to address 
every argument made in that concurrence, its well-crafted 
challenge to equitable mootness makes it worthwhile to lay 
out briefly why this judge-made doctrine is abided by every 
Court of Appeals. 
I. Equitable Mootness Does Not Violate Article 
III. 
The One2One concurrence expresses “serious 
constitutional concerns” with the equitable mootness doctrine.  
Id. at *15.  Perhaps the reason this argument does not make it 
all the way past the goal line to conclude the doctrine is 
actually unconstitutional is that Supreme Court precedent 
refutes the position. 
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The One2One concurrence is concerned that equitable 
mootness insulates the judgments of Article I bankruptcy 
judges’ from review by an Article III tribunal and thus 
violates (1) a personal right to an Article III adjudicator and 
(2) the integrity of the judicial branch of our Government.  To 
the extent that the right to Article III review is “personal,” we 
note that the specific personal right the Supreme Court has 
identified is “to have claims decided before judges who are 
free from potential domination by other branches of 
government.”  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
As an equitable doctrine applied by Article III courts, 
equitable mootness does not implicate this right.   
As for the structural concern, the argument rests on an 
expansive reading of lines of cases where the Supreme Court 
considered whether Congress may redirect adjudication from 
state courts and Article III courts to Article I courts.  Not one 
of the cases relied on discusses whether an Article III court 
may abstain from hearing a case, as the primary evil the cases 
address (congressional aggrandizement) is irrelevant.  See 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 
(2015) (“Article III . . . bar[s] congressional attempts ‘to 
transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the 
purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts and thereby 
prevent[ing] ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one 
branch at the expense of the other.’” (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. 
at 850) (emphasis added) (last two alterations in original)); 
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“Is there 
really a threat to the separation of powers where Congress has 
conferred the judicial power outside Article III only over 
certain counterclaims in bankruptcy? The short but emphatic 
answer is yes. A statute may no more lawfully chip away at 
the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it 
entirely.”); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. 
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985) (“Congress . . . select[ed] 
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arbitration as the appropriate method of dispute resolution.  
Given the nature of the right at issue and the concerns 
motivating the Legislature, we do not think this system 
threatens the independent role of the Judiciary in our 
constitutional scheme.”); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982) (“The constitutional 
system of checks and balances is designed to guard against 
encroachment or aggrandizement by Congress at the expense 
of the other branches of government.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 
(1980) (“Congress was alert to Art. III values concerning the 
vesting of decisionmaking power in magistrates. . . .  We need 
not decide whether, as suggested by the Government, 
Congress could constitutionally have delegated the task of 
rendering a final decision on a suppression motion to a non-
Art. III officer.  Congress has not sought to make any such 
delegation.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49 (1932) (“‘[W]e do not consider 
[C]ongress can . . . withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty.’” (quoting Murray’s 
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 284 (1855)). 
If it seems formalistic to conclude that a court may 
abstain from deciding a case even though Congress may not 
withdraw the same case from the court’s cognizance, that is 
because the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers cases—at 
least where they hold that an Article III violation has 
occurred—are often formalistic.  See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 
1950 (Roberts, C.J. [the author of Stern], dissenting) (“I 
would not yield so fully to functionalism.”).  Neither the 
personal rights nor the separation of powers guaranteed by 
Article III are infringed when Article III courts decline to 
hear a quite constricted class of cases seeking relief that 
would upend cases resolved and plans implemented (often 
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years before) and/or would significantly harm third parties 
who relied on that resolution and implementation.  We 
therefore do not share the constitutional concerns expressed 
in the One2One concurrence. 
II. The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Bar the 
Equitable Mootness Doctrine. 
“[E]very Circuit Court has recognized some form of 
equitable mootness,” save the Federal Circuit (which does not 
hear bankruptcy appeals).  Nil Ghosh, Plan Accordingly: The 
Third Circuit Delivers a Knockout Punch with Equitable 
Mootness, 23 Norton J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 224 & n.8 (2014) 
(collecting cases).1  Though of course that does not prove the 
doctrine’s validity, it is a starting point that counsels us to 
tread lightly in our examination. 
One prominent and frequently cited explanation for the 
genesis of equitable mootness is that various provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, notably §§ 363(m) and 1127(b), bespeak a 
                                              
1 See In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 
1998); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 481 (2d 
Cir. 2012); In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 809 
(4th Cir. 2004); In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 240 
(5th Cir. 2009); In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d 942, 
947 (6th Cir. 2008); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 
(7th Cir. 1994); In re President Casinos, Inc., 409 F. App’x 
31 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 
677 F.3d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 
1327, 1337 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Holywell Corp., 911 F.2d 
1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); In re AOV 
Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147–48 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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congressional intent “that courts should keep their hands off 
consummated transactions.”  In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 
766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.).  The former 
provides that if a sale to a good faith purchaser under 11 
U.S.C. § 363 is reversed on appeal, the reversal will not affect 
the validity of the sale to the purchaser, while § 1127(b) 
limits parties’ ability to modify plans of reorganization 
following substantial consummation.  However, § 1127(b) on 
its own terms is not read to limit the authority of appellate 
courts to forbear reviewing for prudential reasons appeals 
from orders confirming plans now consummated.  UNR, 20 
F.3d at 769.  Although § 1129, the plan confirmation 
provision, is silent on the authority of courts to upend 
consummated plans at late dates, UNR considered that 
omission an “interstice[]” or gap that courts may fill to effect 
the intent of Congress to protect the finality of consummated 
plans, a policy goal that the bench, bar, and academy all 
recognize as undergirding equitable mootness.  See, e.g., id.; 
Lenard Parkins et al., Equitable Mootness: Will Surgery Kill 
the Patient?, 29 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 40 (2010), Troy A. 
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 747, 789–90 (2010) 
(describing doctrine and its justifications). 
A simpler way to reach the same conclusion starts 
from the premise that “bankruptcy courts . . . are courts of 
equity and appl[y] the principles and rules of equity 
jurisprudence.”  Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 
(2002) (last alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 
548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[B]ankruptcy courts are 
equitable tribunals that apply equitable principles in the 
administration of bankruptcy proceedings.”).  As Judge 
Posner has put it, equitable mootness “is perhaps best 
described as merely an application of the age-old principle 
that in formulating equitable relief a court must consider the 
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effects of the relief on innocent third parties.”  In re 
Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Posner, J.); see also In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1335 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable mootness is rooted, at 
least in part, in the court’s discretionary power to fashion a 
remedy in cases seeking equitable relief.”); In re AOV Indus., 
Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147–48 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[T]here 
exists . . . a melange of doctrines relating to the court’s 
discretion in matters of remedy and judicial administration.  
Even when the moving party is not entitled to dismissal on 
[A]rticle III grounds, common sense or equitable 
considerations may justify a decision not to decide a case on 
the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted)).  Our take is that, in the equitable mootness context, 
courts may consider whether it is fair in stark circumstances 
to grant relief that will scramble a consummated plan or will 
upset third parties’ legitimate reliance on the finality of such a 
plan. 
In awarding injunctions, a classic form of equitable 
relief, courts always consider the balance of harms to the 
parties and the public.  Equitable mootness, properly applied, 
similarly reflects a court’s decision that when undoing a 
confirmed and consummated plan would do more harm to 
many than good for one (or but a few), this is inappropriate 
for a court in equity.  To illustrate this principle, consider 
cases where injunctions are statutorily authorized but courts 
still decline to issue one even in the face of a violation and in 
the absence of an alternative remedy.  For example, in 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the Navy violated the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) by discharging 
ordnance into navigable waters.  456 U.S. 305, 309 (1982).  
Rather than enjoin this practice, the District Court ordered the 
Navy to apply for a permit to continue its discharges, but 
specifically allowed the Navy to continue its unpermitted 
activities while its application was pending.  The Court did so 
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because, on balancing the equities in the case, it found that 
the injunction “would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable 
harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general welfare 
of this Nation.”  Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 
707 (D.P.R. 1979).  The Supreme Court held that the decision 
whether to allow a preliminary injunction was left to the 
sound discretion of the District Court notwithstanding the 
apparent ongoing violation of the FWPCA.  Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. at 320. 
Similarly, in the preliminary injunction context, the 
Supreme Court has allowed district courts to deny relief even 
if the party seeking it meets convincingly the success-on-the-
merits requirement.  In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, Alaska, 
a federal agency allowed oil companies to drill for oil on 
public lands without giving notice to affected Alaska Natives, 
an alleged violation of the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act.  480 U.S. 531 (1987).  Alaska Natives 
sought a preliminary injunction barring the drilling.  The 
District Court held that, while the Act applied to the 
permitting agency, the public interest weighed in favor of oil 
exploration under the facts presented and, on balance, denied 
the preliminary injunction.  The Supreme Court held that 
withholding relief was proper despite the finding of a “strong 
likelihood” of success on the merits.  Id. at 541, 544–46. 
Although these cases are far from factually on point 
here, they reinforce the appropriateness of courts’ discretion 
in issuing or withholding equitable remedies.  The doctrine of 
equitable mootness recognizes those few situations where the 
practical harm caused by granting relief would greatly 
outweigh the benefit.  Discretion is no less appropriate in the 
plan confirmation context than in ordering other equitable 
remedies; hence we believe that the One2One concurrence’s 
formal challenge that equitable mootness lacks a basis in law 
misses the point that it is in the equitable toolbox of judges 
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for that scarce case where the relief sought on appeal from an 
implemented plan, if granted, would leave the plan in tatters 
and/or bankruptcy battlefield strewn with too many injured 
bodies. 
III. Equitable Mootness Can Be Beneficial as a 
Practical Matter. 
As for the practical challenge, we acknowledge the 
unfairness that might result where an aggrieved party is 
deprived of appellate relief even in the face of an erroneous 
lower court decision.  But remember, equitable mootness is 
only in play for consideration when modifying a court order 
approving a since-consummated plan would do significant 
harm.  The possibility that a successful appeal will not cause 
such harm is no reason to abandon the doctrine altogether.  
Rather, it counsels us to adhere to our precedent that equitable 
mootness “should be the rare exception and not the rule.”  Id. 
at 321.  Moreover, our Court has certainly not been reluctant 
to reverse ill-advised equitable mootness grants.  See, e.g., 
supra, Maj. Op. at II.C; Semcrude, 728 F.3d 314 at 323; 
Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 170; Zenith Elecs. Corp., 329 
F.3d at 346. 
Cases where prudence counsels courts not to hear 
appeals are rare, but they are real.  Complex bankruptcies 
reorganize thousands of relationships among countless 
parties.  When a plan is substantially consummated, it is 
sometimes not only as difficult to restore an estate to the 
status quo ante consummation as it is to gather all the feathers 
from the proverbial pillow, it is also a crushing expense to the 
reorganized entity and its shareholders.  If we jettisoned the 
entire equitable mootness doctrine, it is hard to imagine that 
any complex plan would be consummated until all appeals are 
terminated.  For why would an equity investor wish to put 
money into a reorganized entity if the plan could be ordered 
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unraveled?  And would not the cost of credit increase 
prohibitively with such a specter?  Without equitable 
mootness, any dissenting creditor with a plausible (or even 
not-so-plausible) sounding argument against plan 
confirmation could effectively hold up emergence from 
bankruptcy for years (or until such time as other constituents 
decide to pay the dissenter sufficient settlement consideration 
to drop the appeal), a most costly proposition. 
The costs of remaining in bankruptcy underscore one 
factor that significantly mitigates the injustice to a wronged 
appellant whose cause may otherwise be deemed moot—the 
availability of a stay pending appeal.  Indeed, If a party 
obtains a stay, the plan cannot be substantially consummated 
and thus the appeal cannot be equitably moot.   
We acknowledge, however, that stays are costly to 
estates: in order to operate a business without court 
supervision and in order to sell shares on the public markets, 
entities must emerge from bankruptcy with prepetition 
liabilities restructured or discharged.  Thus every day that a 
company remains in bankruptcy is a day when it will have a 
hard time attracting the investors, employees, and, in some 
industries, customers that it needs to exist and prosper.   
To protect against this loss, courts may condition stays 
pending appeal on the posting of a supersedeas bond.  As 
demonstrated by the careful discussion by Judge Carey in this 
case, valuing the costs for a stay of a plan confirmation order 
should be feasible in a case involving sophisticated business 
entities who can hire experts and litigate complex valuation 
questions.  We thus see practical benefit to allowing a stay if 
the appellant is willing to post a bond set within a reasonable 
range.  Such an order would balance the conceivable harms to 
various constituencies and would also shift to the appealing 
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party the burden of determining whether its appeal is really 
worth the candle.   
IV. Conclusion 
Were we able to revisit our Circuit’s precedent that 
equitable mootness is available in the right circumstance 
(consequently rejecting the views of every other Circuit that 
hears bankruptcy appeals), we would decline to discard this 
tool of equity.2  In a very few cases, shutting an appellant out 
                                              
2 In addition to its challenge to the basis in law for equitable 
mootness, the One2One concurrence suggests several 
possible modifications to the doctrine should it remain.  We 
express no views with respect to whether some or all of those 
proposed changes would be beneficial.  However, we note 
that it would be unwise to crystallize as a requirement what 
Judge Krause’s concurrence views as a trend in favor of 
deciding the merits of an appeal before equitable mootness is 
addressed.  Slip Op. at 25–27 (advocating that we “requir[e] a 
ruling on the merits” before deciding whether to forbear 
deciding the appeal) (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 
F.3d at 303–04;  In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005); Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage 
Foundation, 663 F.3d 704, 713 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011)).  While 
we certainly agree that “a court is not inhibited from 
considering the merits before considering equitable 
mootness,” Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 144, and add that such 
an approach often will save substantial time, energy, and 
money, courts have had unpleasant experiences with “rigid 
order[s] of battle” like this before, and we do not see the 
wisdom of an ironclad requirement for all cases.  Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
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of the courthouse does substantially less harm than locking a 
debtor inside.  Federal courts have ample equitable authority 
to decide when no remedy is appropriate, and thus, though we 
should always presume that appeal merits be reached and act 
with the utmost care when we turn aside an appeal, equitable 
mootness remains a last-ditch discretionary device for 
protecting the finality of an unstayed plan that has been 
consummated. 
                                                                                                     
omitted); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 
574, 584 (1999) (allowing personal jurisdiction to be decided 
before subject-matter jurisdiction notwithstanding recent case 
that had held deciding subject-matter jurisdiction first is a 
practice “inflexible and without exception,” Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)). 
